3 years since October 7: what effects has war produced on balance of power in Middle East?

The war that erupted on October 7, 2023, is no ordinary event in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict despite the fact that the start of this war came in form of the operation conducted by Hamas against Israel.

After three years of confrontation, the war spread its influence from the borders of Gaza to reach the territories of Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and even Iranian territory. The conflict changed from one that was being waged via Iran's proxies and allies to one that involved Iran itself, which eventually became an enemy of the USA.

The developments did not happen overnight, but they exposed the changes in the nature of the war. Iran, having developed a sophisticated regional network through years, depending on its armed proxies in several theaters, found itself confronting an Israeli enemy, who decided to attack this network by striking its headquarters and military bases, finally reaching its heartlands.

At the same time, Israel failed to convert its military supremacy into a political solution, that will stop the war and prevent any threats to continue in the region.

Gaza was the trigger, but Lebanon showed the first sign that the war will go beyond the Palestinian-Israeli dimension. On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah opened the southern Lebanese front and integrated its actions with the war in Gaza, starting a fight that will last for several months until a large-scale Israeli offensive against the group in September 2024.

In Yemen, the Houthis joined the war in October 2023, and on October 31 claimed launching missiles and drones against Israel.

On November 19, the Houthis hijacked the ship Galaxy Leader, transforming the fighting from attacks on Israel to threaten the shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb strait.

Here, one of the most important consequences of the war emerged: military geography was no longer confined to the traditional areas of conflict. Houthi attacks forced the United States and its allies to deal with the Red Sea as a military front, while the Bab el-Mandeb became a pressure tool against international trade, just as the Strait of Hormuz later became one of Iran's most important sources of leverage in its direct confrontation with Israel and the United States.

As for Iran, it maintained its position during the first months as a supporter and guide of its allies without entering into a direct war with Israel. But this dividing line began to collapse on April 1, 2024, when Israel targeted the Iranian consulate building in Damascus and killed seven members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi.

Less than two weeks later, on April 13, Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles toward Israel, marking the first large-scale direct attack against Israel from Iranian territory.

That moment was more significant than the scale of the damage caused by the attack itself. It demonstrated that Iran's response would not necessarily remain confined to Hezbollah, Iraqi factions, or the Houthis, and that Tehran was prepared to move toward direct confrontation when it believed that its interests or key leadership figures had suffered a major blow.

At the same time, the operation demonstrated Israel's ability to operate within a broad regional and international air-defense network, as the overwhelming majority of the Iranian projectiles were intercepted.

Israel subsequently moved to target the leadership structure of Iran's axis more directly. On July 31, 2024, Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran after attending the inauguration ceremony of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Less than two months later, on September 27, Hassan Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli strike targeting Hezbollah's central headquarters in Beirut's southern suburbs, and the group officially announced his death the following day.

Nasrallah's killing was not merely the loss of a military commander; it was a blow to one of the most important pillars of Iranian influence in the region, given that Hezbollah had for years been the most organized and heavily armed force within Tehran's network of allies.

As Hezbollah's ability to operate as an independent deterrent force declined, and Hamas came under heavy military strikes, Iran gradually began to lose part of the strategic depth on which it had relied to manage its conflict with Israel. However, Tehran did not immediately move toward all-out confrontation. The major shift came on June 13, 2025, when Israel launched a large-scale attack on Iran targeting nuclear and military facilities and senior leaders, triggering the first broad direct war between the two countries.

Iran responded with missiles and drones targeting Israeli territory, before a ceasefire was reached on June 24, after 12 days of fighting.

The war revealed the disparity in military and intelligence capabilities between the two sides, but it also exposed the limits of Israeli power. Israel was able to reach deep into Iranian territory and target sensitive facilities and leaders, but it was unable to permanently eliminate Iran's nuclear program, while Iran retained the ability to launch missiles and inflict damage inside Israel.

Then came the 2026 war, pushing the confrontation to an entirely different level. On February 28, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale attack on Iran targeting command centers and military and nuclear facilities. The attack culminated in the killing of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in an unprecedented blow to the system he had led since 1989.

Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure also suffered significant damage, while Tehran responded by targeting Israel as well as U.S. bases and interests in the region.

At this point, the war shifted from a confrontation over Iran's nuclear program or its regional influence into a struggle over the Iranian state's own ability to continue imposing the deterrence equations it had built over the previous decades.

Khamenei's killing was not merely a military event; it was a political blow to the symbolism of the regime and the centrality of its leadership, which had constituted one of the elements of its stability for more than three decades.

However, Iran's losses do not mean that Israel emerged from the three years as a complete victor. It is true that Israel succeeded in weakening Hamas and Hezbollah, killing several prominent leaders of Iran's axis, moving the confrontation into Iranian territory, and demonstrating intelligence and military capabilities that allowed it to operate deep inside its adversaries' territory. It also received direct U.S. military and political support at crucial stages.

Yet these gains came amid a prolonged war that imposed significant economic, military, and security costs and kept the Israeli home front under the threat of missiles and drones.

Moreover, Israel has so far failed to achieve a political objective commensurate with the scale of its military operations. Military power can destroy facilities and kill leaders, but it cannot by itself produce a political settlement to the Palestinian conflict, guarantee that organizations subjected to military strikes will not rebuild, or eliminate Iran's ability to reorganize part of its military capabilities over time.

As for Iran, its strategic loss was more evident. The deterrence network it had built over many years was damaged, its allies lost prominent leaders and military capabilities, and Iranian territory itself came under repeated attacks, before the targeting reached the head of the regime in 2026.

Tehran's resort to tools such as the Strait of Hormuz also reflects, in part, its shift from a strategy of operating through a broad regional network toward seeking direct means of exerting pressure on the United States, Israel, and the global economy.

On March 2, 2026, Iran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a move that demonstrated that the war was no longer threatening the Middle East alone. The strait, along with the Bab el-Mandeb, became part of the equation of global economic warfare, because disruptions to navigation through them affect oil and gas, shipping and insurance costs, and supply chains.

The most important thing that can be said after three years is that the result of the October 7 war is a new balance of power, but not a better peace in the Middle East. The Israeli army succeeded in weakening its major enemies and brought the war to Iran, while Tehran, having lost the deterrence capacity that it built for decades, could not accomplish any political purpose.

Thus, October 7 is not only the day when the Gaza war started, but also the beginning of a chain of transformations that slowly changed the old laws of engagement. While Hezbollah went from being a support base to being involved in a full-scale war, the Houthis managed to drag the conflict out to the international maritime route, while Iran left the war of proxies to fight directly and turned its own territory into an open war zone. And while the Israeli army used to contain the enemy on its borders, it now targeted its enemies' bases in Beirut, Tehran, and Yemen.

This transformation has not yet produced a new regional order. Instead, it has left the region facing a greater vacuum in the rules governing deterrence and political settlements. This means that, three years later, the question is no longer simply who won the October 7 war, but whether the region is capable of escaping the logic of successive wars, now that any escalation in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, or Iran can rapidly turn into a crisis that extends beyond the borders of the arena in which it began.

ANHA