In the case of Turkey, according to the writer, the popularity of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has gradually deteriorated since several months, and there is a real fear among the Middle East observers that Erdogan may consider interference in Cyprus for the reasons mentioned above.
The writer notes that Turkey occupied 40% of Cyprus in July 1974 and continues to do so although it confirms that the military action was an "intervention" to protect the Turkish population.
In his internal view of Turkey, as in his foreign policies and military functions, Erdogan has turned to many parties, especially in the foreign policy, to the point where he has lost much of the glamor he once had. There is no doubt that Erdogan is very weak now.
In the opinion of the writer, in the event of an incursion in Cyprus, it is likely that the Turkish army will overcome the small Greek Cypriot force and will be an appropriate transformation from the challenges to his tyrannical rule.
He confirms that rethinking in Cyprus militarily can help Erdogan to boost his wealth, but that can cause him more headaches than he knows with neighbors, including Egypt and Israel, let alone the EU and the US.
In the face of a severe economic crisis at home, Erdogan may be tempted to pursue offshore oil fields, recently discovered off the coast of Israel, Lebanon and Cyprus, for which Turkey has tried to make a partial claim.
The Turkish president may believe that this can provide a quick solution to his growing domestic problems.
However, Erdogan will face acute problems with the United States, and the Trump administration is totally distressed by the Turkish leader for his intention to purchase Russian S-400 missile defense systems. In Washington, the Pentagon expressed deep concern over Turkey's actions.
Pentagon officials worry that the Russians, while installing the S-400, will gather intelligence information about the new US warplane favored by the United States.
Looking ahead, the Greeks, especially the Greek Cypriots, fear a repeat of the "intervention" of 1974. This time, however, the extent to which the conflict can spread rapidly from the Middle East to Europe and beyond is much higher. All parties have better and greater weapons and are not afraid to use them.