Predators conflict in Syria

The current situation in Idlib does not deviate from the general scene of the Syrian situation, there is what we might call two patches of attraction and conflict for the intervening regional and international powers in Syria, and if each of them has its own peculiarities and distinctions,

The current situation in Idlib does not deviate from the general scene of the Syrian situation, there is what we might call two patches of attraction and conflict for the intervening regional and international powers in Syria, and if each of them has its own peculiarities and distinctions, these tow patches or regions are, in this regard, two regions distinguished with instability within them because they are the focus of conflict between these regional and international countries whose presence in them is a fundamental card to impose their conditions and influence on the reality of Syria and its future, these two areas mentioned above are Idlib and the Turkish occupation regions, and the regions of northern and eastern Syria.

The American presence in northern and eastern Syria controls, to some extent, the interventions of Turkey and the regime, its allies in northern and eastern Syria according to the interests of the United States only, and despite this, the instability and the lack of clarity of what the future of the region will be from the point of view of the intervening countries remains the salient feature. Hence, our focus is on the necessity of transforming the Autonomous Administration in the region, and it is an internal "national" actor whose strategy and dynamics are embedded in reality to a comprehensive national project with the development of experience with real and wide popular participation which has a progressive political and social nature to be a center of attraction for all Syrians. All of this is by relying on our people's own capabilities and energies, and getting rid of the illusion of relying on any of the intervening regional and international states in our country because that is a salvation for the Syrians.

While the situation in Idlib is different, as there are, in addition to the Turkish occupation army and its mercenaries, various Salafi jihadist factions, the most important of which is Jabhet al-Nusra, and these jihadist terrorist factions are used by Turkey in two ways: the first as its proxy in controlling some areas there, and the most important in controlling the population. The second is that it uses it as a dangerous terrorist boogeyman that it negotiates with Russia and others over it, claiming that it will work to limit it, which strengthens its cards in extracting greater concessions from Russia.

On the other hand, Russia believes that the survival of this situation in Idlib constitutes a dumbbell or an outlet in the side of its project to extend its control in Syria, as it is the most important and central country in determining the country's fate and the regime's, which constitutes a major obstacle for it in its project. Therefore, it is left to Turkey, in each time, a time slot to implement its obligations, and for the sake of preserving Turkey as a "bitter" ally, but it returns to carry out limited military actions with the regime to reduce the influence of the areas outside the control of the regime in Idlib.

The military build-up by both sides in Idlib enters this framework of Turkish-Russian negotiations with each other's feeling of regret, and I do not think that a large-scale military attack is on Russia's agenda in Idlib because that would undermine its relations with Turkey to the extent that it would be, as usual, limited gnawing operations, if occurred.

This is, unfortunately, the case in Syria from the standpoint of the interests and competition of regional and international countries within it.

What is more regrettable is that sectors of the Syrian opposition, instead of building themselves, mobilizing their forces and meeting in a national framework that gives the Syrians a voice and a free and independent democratic platform, we see them join and follow the policies of this or that state, which increases the ability of the intervening countries to grasp the fate of Syria, the Syrians and their future.

Therefore, we believe that building a broad united front for the Syrian democratic and social forces for the sake of national, political and social liberation with complete independence from all concerned countries is an urgent task, without which the next will only be worse for all Syrians.

D.H