The Turkish occupation has only a short time to implement the recent Sochi agreement with Russia in Idlib, it is not clear yet whether Turkey will resort to military force or flexibility to carry out the first step or not. In particular, hesitation is the master of the situation in all parties of Turkey without being satisfied. It is precisely for this moment that Turkey has resisted their presence in exchange for its interests and can resort to selling them as soon as possible, if had not already sold them.
The first step, which is supposed to be implemented by October 15, is the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the demilitarized zone, whose implementation is still going through some difficulties that will not seem to be long-term hindered, although Turkey's parties have not yet found sufficient and convincing justification for such step, it is already far from answering the fears of its constituents and their questions as to whether the regime, Russia and Iran have found a new pretext for the attack or impose other complementary agreements that could lead to putting more pressure on them and their depletion and impose a new reality on them. Especially that the provocative and repeated Russian statements about the duration of the interim agreement and its objectives of disposing of these groups, did not bother Turkey and we do not feel any reaction from them may distance suspicions of bargaining with Russia at the expense of mercenary gangs."
It has not been able to give hope to mercenary gangs about its military and political survival in the near and distant future. The regime and its allies are confident about their plans in the region. The agreement created another opportunity for the regime in order to strengthen its positions in the northern, eastern and western Hama and Aleppo, which could have been a gap exploited by mercenary gangs to overthrow the military equation in the event of the launching of the Idlib battle without closing it tightly. This has been and is still happening. In addition to reinforcing the sites on the outskirts of Idlib, under the cover of Russian reconnaissance planes to move its heavy and military weapons in the area stretching from the villages of Hama- Idlib - Aleppo countryside, and these moves are carried out in preparation for a battle may appear close if the regional and international political conditions helped the regime.
There is no doubt that Turkey succeeded in imposing its agendas on its mercenary gangs and lost a large part of its respect, with its role in the collapse of the areas of control of these gangs being collapsed one by one. It is obliged to work with all its might to implement the steps of the Sochi Convention. The parties will ask for more time if they can not keep their promises on time and Russia will not give up more opportunities to do so. It is not possible for Russia to get a more valuable opportunity than Turkey promised to get rid of the power of militant gangs such as the Jabhat al-Nasra(Haiet Tahrir al-Sham), and secure areas of Russian influence and military bases voluntarily.
Turkey may intervene in a mock battle similar to its imaginary battle against IS in Jarablus in 2016, which preserves its mercenaries who have brought them and trained them. It also earns a good reputation in fighting the formality of terrorism represented by Hayet Tahrir al-Sham" and Huras al-Din. We do not know if Russia is forced to believe Turkey in the event of its imaginary battle, which Russia has repeatedly stressed the need to get rid of terrorists without engaging in other side deals.
The implementation of the first step of the agreement by Turkey does not mean that it is safe in the Syrian issue and the issue of Idlib in particular, which is not at its best over the past six years, and is now more than ever in a real and cautious predicament, and invited to stay away from maneuvering and persuading the Russians to move the agreement from purely military status to political negotiations, as it now needs to perform an almost impossible task in asserting its confused bets about controlling its mercenaries and convincing them of the low ceiling of demands without giving any real guarantees that contribute to the crystallization of a vision that may distance them from the regime and its allies. In a relevant concern, Turkey has a hard task to show its efforts to the Russian-Iranian-Syrian spectator, which will not be far from failure with the insistence of the other side on the military solution in Idlib, which apparently did not escape all parties, stressing the impossibility of coexistence among them in the present and in the future, which Turkey cannot adapt to in the long term with the collision of colonial ambitions with Russian-Iranian ambitions appear greater and more weight and originality in the Syrian issue in general, which will fuel the conflict again over time, where developments in the whole of the Syrian issue will not be in the interest of Turkey, which has always divided the case hopping to get its share.
Until then, as the deadline for implementing the first step - the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the demilitarized zone that is supposed to be formed by the middle of this month - has come to an end, the signs of cautious movement by the mercenary factions to implement and withdraw their weapons have emerged over the past few days, meanwhile, the Turkish intelligence agency (MIT), which Erdogan has authorized, has put pressure on the mercenary factions to work quietly through daily meetings with the mercenary factions, including( Hayet Tahrir al-Sham), which is classified as terrorist. The question of the size and location of the buffer zone, the issue of Russian patrols and the obligations of the military forces of the regime, their future and duration, as well as the lack of clarity, further complicate the implementation of the convention. It is difficult to predict how it will continue. The aggressive tendencies of the parties and the mercenary factions and their supporters will not be removed. We will wait for the identity of the initiator in violation of the inevitable agreement with the clarification of the lack of seriousness of all parties in resolving the issue as required by the interests of the Syrians themselves, and approaches based on the idea of winning first and more at the expense of Syrian blood.