Journalist: Military integration alone is not enough for Shengal

On February 27, 2025, Leader Abdullah Ocalan announced the Peace and Democratic Society Process in Turkey and Northern Kurdistan, making democratic integration a central topic of discussion across the four parts of Kurdistan.

Shengal is one of the areas where this process has gained prominence. On September 11, representatives of the Shengal Resistance Units (YBŞ), the Shengal Women's Resistance Units (YJŞ), and the Êzidî Asayish met with Ali al-Zaidi's government in Baghdad to begin discussions on democratic integration.

In this context, journalist Arkeş Şengali, who closely follows developments in the process, spoke to our agency about the stages of the negotiations, the future of local security forces, the status of the Autonomous Administration, ways to protect Êzidî identity, and efforts to ensure the return of displaced people to their homes.

Interview

• What stage have negotiations between the Iraqi federal government and Shengal's representatives reached within the framework of democratic integration?

The concept and practice of democratic integration draw their main foundations from the Peace and Democratic Society Process launched by Leader Abdullah Ocalan. This process has had a profound impact across the region, with many areas benefiting from it. Shengal is one of them.

In particular, between 2017 and 2024, Shengal faced continuous Turkish air and ground attacks. This prompted the local community to seek ways to maintain its cohesion and resilience and establish relations with the state within whose borders it lives on the basis of democratic integration.

Following the 2014 massacre and attacks, the Shengal Resistance Units (YBŞ) and the Shengal Women's Resistance Units (YJŞ) fought extensive battles in the area. Under successive Iraqi governments, beginning with Nouri al-Maliki's administration and continuing through the governments of Haider al-Abadi, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, up to Ali al-Zaidi's government, Shengal continued to face security and political challenges.

After ten years of resistance against attacks and provocations, the Iraqi state sat at the negotiating table for the first time in its history with a force that had taken up arms to defend the area. The talks took place at the highest level of decision-making, with the aim of reaching an official and legitimate framework for integration.

During the September 11 meeting between Shengal's representatives and Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, the mechanisms for integration, the status of the military forces, and the position of the Shengal People's Council institutions were discussed explicitly.

However, the process slowed following the meeting held in New York and the meeting between officials from Ankara and Baghdad. This was due to conditions put forward by Turkey, particularly its demand that Mount Shengal be handed over and turned into a military zone under the control of the Iraqi army. These demands placed considerable pressure on Baghdad.

• What points have been agreed upon, and what issues remain disputed regarding the preservation of the area's administrative and political status and the mechanisms of self-administration? What are the positions of other parties on this process?

So far, the negotiations have not been limited to the military file. They have also addressed the administrative and political status of the Êzidî community and its civil institutions, as well as the position of the area's security and defense forces.

The Shengal administration stresses that military integration alone is not enough and that comprehensive steps must also be taken at the political and administrative levels. Just as the organization of defense forces since 2014 contributed to building a broad civil and political structure, issues such as appointing a district administrator, establishing a local administration, and granting official recognition to the work of councils are now among the matters on Baghdad's agenda.

On the administrative front, in-depth discussions are underway concerning demographic changes that began under Saddam Hussein in 1975, when Shengal was divided and parts of its territory were incorporated into predominantly Arab areas.

The main demand today is the full reintegration of the Tel Ezîr subdistrict and surrounding villages into Shengal's administrative center, allowing its historical boundaries to be restored. Accordingly, rather than returning to previous administrative arrangements, the Êzidî community is calling for a decentralized administrative status that would grant it a degree of administrative autonomy, similar to that of Zakho, Garmian, and Zubair, while maintaining its connection to the central government in Baghdad.

On October 9, 2020, an agreement on Shengal was reached between Erbil and Baghdad without addressing Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, which is viewed as an obstacle to this direct dialogue.

Meanwhile, statements by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK) describe the existing institutions and defense forces in Shengal as unofficial formations, reflecting opposition to the will of the local administration.

The success of a model of direct democratic integration between Shengal and Baghdad would undermine the impact of the October 2020 agreement and weaken reliance on Article 140 as a framework for addressing the status of disputed territories.

• How will the future of the Shengal Resistance Units (YBŞ), the Shengal Women's Resistance Units (YJŞ), and the Êzidî Asayish be determined through the negotiations? How will relations between these forces and Iraq's official security institutions be organized to ensure that weapons remain under state control while allowing Êzidîs to retain their role in protecting their region?

The Shengal Resistance Units (YBŞ), the Shengal Women's Resistance Units (YJŞ), and the Êzidî Asayish are at a critical stage in their negotiations with the Iraqi federal government.

Drawing on the historical experience of the August 3, 2014, genocide (Ferman), the Êzidî community stresses that Shengal's security can only be guaranteed by local forces originating from the region itself. Accordingly, any integration process that leads to the dismantling or dissolution of these forces is unacceptable to the community, according to this position.

The current forces comprise approximately 5,000 fighters in the Shengal Resistance Units, more than 2,000 women fighters in the Shengal Women's Resistance Units, and over 2,000 members of the Êzidî Asayish. These forces seek to preserve their identity and defensive role.

The key issue in the negotiations with the Iraqi prime minister's office is to grant these forces official status within the state's legal framework, ensuring their recognition and the lawful organization of their activities.

Under the proposed plan, more than 4,000 fighters are expected to be integrated into official institutions in the first phase, on the condition that they remain in Shengal and continue their duties as an official force responsible for protecting sacred sites, the mountain, and the Êzidî community.

• How are the protection of Êzidî temples and sacred sites and the preservation of their historical and cultural heritage being discussed in the negotiations? Is democratic integration viewed merely as an administrative and military arrangement, or as a comprehensive solution?

Protecting temples and sacred sites is one of the key issues in the negotiations. Shengal has between 70 and 80 shrines, temples, domes, and other sacred sites, many of which were blown up or destroyed in 2014.

According to the position being put forward, the protection of these sites cannot be entrusted to people from outside the Êzidî community, given their religious beliefs and collective religious memory.

Therefore, there are calls for a special force composed of young members of the Êzidî community who adhere to its faith to be established within the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. This force would be exclusively responsible for protecting these sacred sites and preserving their sanctity.

This demand reflects a vision that goes beyond military and administrative arrangements to include the protection of Êzidî religious and cultural identity and the preservation of their historical heritage.

• What plans and preparations are in place to ensure the safe return of Êzidîs who are still living in camps? What are the main obstacles, and what steps are needed to facilitate their return?

Despite repeated calls by the Shengal Reconstruction Council, obstacles continue to prevent displaced people from returning to their homes.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK) is obstructing their return, according to the interviewee, by using the camps to secure funding from the United Nations and as an electoral bargaining tool.

Meanwhile, responsibility for compensation lies with the Iraqi federal government and the Ministry of Migration and Displacement. Every family affected by ISIS attacks must receive compensation so that they can rebuild their homes and resume their normal lives.

If these steps are taken seriously, the government could return all displaced people within one month, based on the view that Shengal offers the Êzidî community a safer environment than other places of displacement.

Accordingly, practical measures are needed to resolve the displacement issue by providing the necessary compensation, rebuilding homes, and establishing the security and public service conditions required to ensure a safe, dignified, and sustainable return.

ANHA