latest US midterm elections, their impact on Iran, Ukraine, China, Israel, Syria

The results of the US midterm elections do not simply represent a shift in the balance of power within Congress. Rather, they usher in a new phase of interaction between political institutions, which could have implications for US President Donald Trump's management of international affairs and the limits of his ability to implement his policies. The results come amid tensions involving Iran, Ukraine, China, Israel, and Syria's future. Does this signal impending change?

Iran: The elections increase the cost of continuing the war but do not end the confrontation

The Iranian file represents the most sensitive test, as the war has evolved into a domestic issue linked to energy prices, inflation, and the cost of living. Vice President J.D. Vance has acknowledged that the war contributed to the Republicans' electoral losses, placing Trump between demonstrating strength and avoiding the depletion of his political capital.

Democrats may tighten oversight of military operations and their costs, using their spending powers to put pressure on the administration. However, they cannot end the war on their own, as the president retains broad discretion in managing military operations.

The electoral defeat may prompt Trump to accelerate efforts to reach a settlement with Tehran in order to ease economic pressures, or alternatively, to escalate the confrontation to demonstrate resolve and regain the initiative.

Iran, for its part, may see an opportunity to improve its negotiating terms. However, it cannot assume that Washington will abandon its efforts to contain Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities and its regional influence.

Therefore, a combination of military threats and diplomatic engagement, potentially leading to interim understandings, appears to be the most likely scenario.

Ukraine: prospects for support improve without any guarantee of a change in White House policy

The results give Kyiv an opportunity to revive support within US institutions after it faced pressure from the Trump administration to accept a settlement that would bring the war with Russia to an end. Democrats are more inclined to continue providing assistance, fearing that Moscow's gains could undermine European security and encourage other powers.

They can influence budgets and aid packages, while monitoring any easing of sanctions or reduction in commitments toward Europe.

However, Trump retains extensive tools to control arms supplies, intelligence sharing, and negotiations, in addition to his presidential veto power.

Democrats also do not share a unified position on foreign spending, and support for Ukraine is not a priority for all voters. Consequently, pressure may increase to prevent major concessions to Russia, while Moscow may exploit these divisions to strengthen its negotiating position.

China: strategic competition continues, with the possibility of adjusting the means of confrontation

The elections are not expected to change the US view of China as its foremost strategic competitor. Both parties agree on limiting China's technological superiority and countering its military expansion in the Indo-Pacific region.

However, differences may emerge over how to manage this competition. Democrats favor coordination with allies, while Trump relies on tariffs and direct economic pressure. Congress may examine the impact of these measures on businesses and consumers.

Beijing may benefit from Washington's preoccupation with its internal divisions and the declining clarity of its messages to allies. However, it will not regard this as the end of US containment efforts, particularly regarding Taiwan, technology, and maritime security. Trade negotiations may expand alongside the continuation of strategic competition.

Israel: A narrowing scope for unconditional support

US-Israeli relations are entering a more complicated phase, as disagreements within the Democratic Party over Israeli policies and the wars in Gaza and the wider region continue to intensify.

A Democratic majority may push for a review of aid and for arms shipments to be made conditional on legal requirements.

This shift is also linked to changes in US public opinion, as unconditional support for Israel no longer enjoys the same political consensus it once did. The cost of confrontation with Iran may also increase US reservations about conflicts that serve Israel's priorities.

This does not mean the alliance is collapsing. Military and intelligence cooperation, shared interests, and Republican support remain significant factors. However, the relationship may come under greater scrutiny, with the possibility of using aid as a tool of pressure, affecting Israel's calculations regarding Iran, Syria, and Lebanon.

Syria: The future of US engagement and the limits of support for the transitional phase

Regarding US policy toward Syria, the country may be affected by the election results, but it will remain part of Washington's strategic calculations. The Trump administration has viewed the political transition in Damascus as an opportunity to reshape Syria's regional position following the decline of Iranian influence and the end of the period of extensive reliance on Moscow and Tehran. Therefore, opening up to Syria's new authorities forms part of a broader vision aimed at integrating Syria into new regional arrangements.

The election results may lead to greater scrutiny of this approach. Trump tends to favor direct engagement with Damascus and to prioritize geopolitical, security, and economic considerations. Democrats, meanwhile, may call for such engagement to be tied to standards concerning the nature of governance, the distribution of power, the protection of different components of society, and accountability for violations. This does not necessarily mean rejecting engagement, but rather imposing stricter conditions on it.

Reconstruction stands out as a key area of influence. The lifting of US restrictions could pave the way for the resumption of financing, investment, and trade. However, this alone is insufficient to launch large-scale reconstruction, which requires legal guarantees, stable institutions, and investor confidence.

Accordingly, economic agreements may be subject to greater scrutiny to prevent the lifting of sanctions from turning into unconditional support.

The challenge extends beyond the economy to the future of the state itself. Washington wants a unified authority, but it does not want to provide cover for the reproduction of a centralized security-based system of governance that excludes segments of society.

Events in the coastal region and Swedia have demonstrated that unifying authority does not necessarily guarantee the establishment of an inclusive state. Democrats may call for transitional justice, accountability for perpetrators of violations, guarantees of participation for all components of society, and placing the security apparatus under oversight. However, conditions that cannot be implemented quickly may obstruct recovery and stability.

From a security perspective, Damascus moving away from Tehran and reducing its networks of influence represents a gain for Washington. Any understanding will remain tied to preventing the return of armed formations affiliated with Iran, combating "extremist organizations," and securing the borders.

Democrats may agree with these objectives while differing over the means of achieving them and the US military presence. Reducing that presence before completing security arrangements and efforts to combat ISIS could create a vacuum that extremist organizations and regional powers might exploit.

Israel and Türkiye also influence Washington's calculations. Trump may seek to push Damascus toward a security agreement with Israel. However, any understanding that ignores withdrawal from the areas entered by Israeli forces following the fall of the Assad regime, as well as the issues of the Golan Heights, sovereignty, and mutual guarantees, could undermine the government's legitimacy.

Türkiye's influence also requires Washington to balance its relations with Ankara, Damascus, and Tel Aviv, a balancing act in which the United States may continue to play a role.

A change in decision-making mechanisms, not in US interests

Based on these indicators, the election results reveal a decline in Trump's ability to act without political and legislative oversight, while he retains broad executive powers. This may slow down decision-making and strengthen Congress's role in matters of war, spending, and sanctions.

However, the Republicans' losses do not mean a return of US policy to the traditional Democratic approach, nor do they signal Washington's retreat from competing with China, containing Iran, or honoring its commitments to Israel and Europe. These issues are tied to strategic and institutional interests that extend beyond a single electoral cycle.

The most realistic possibility is that the administration will increasingly resort to foreign policy maneuvering to compensate for domestic constraints, while Democrats use oversight and funding mechanisms to impose conditions on its decisions.

For regional and international powers, the elections will not guarantee gains for any side. Rather, they will constitute another factor in reassessing risks and opportunities. Iran may bet on constraints being placed on the war, Ukraine on continued support, China on US divisions, and Israel on Washington's commitments, while Syria's opportunity remains limited.

ANHA